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Abstract
In the direct democratic arena, the consensus of voters is required to deliberate policies; without that consent policies are
blocked. When bills that support cultural diversity or foreigners’ integration are put into referendums, voters may or may
not exert their veto power over the proposed policies. In order to determine under which circumstances these types of
bills are successful in referendum, I have undertaken a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis of 39 referendums about
the extension of political rights to foreigners at the Swiss cantonal level. My analysis identified a total of five theoretically-
informed conditions that explain citizenship liberalization and the success of popular votes. I then located these conditions
within two configurational hypotheses which postulate how referendum proponents might overcome direct democratic
hurdles. The analysis of the success of referendums reveals that the only sufficient path that leads to the popular vote’s
success is to insert the sensitive issues into a multi-faceted bill. As demonstrated by a more in-depth case analysis, the
sensitive object is successful because it is hidden from voters during the referendum campaign or because other priority
objects inside the bill reduce its salience.
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1. Introduction
Christian Joppke (2010) asserted that in Western democ-
racies it is possible to witness a trend toward what he
called “citizenship light” (CL) a form of citizenship char-
acterized by the following attributes: easy access to for-
mal citizenship status; more rights than obligations; the
lack of a sharp distinction between citizens and certain
aliens; and capped by thin identities. Joppke (2007, p. 38,
2010, pp. 19–29) suggested that citizenship is becoming
less exclusive toward aliens, given that aliens and citi-
zens have similar or identical rights, and more inclusive
toward minorities, due to the attitude of promoting cul-
tural pluralism.
However, while the literature on CL contributes to
the understanding of the citizenship liberalization, it has
two important shortcomings. First, CL literature lacks a
comprehensive understanding of the CL trend in other
democratic decision-making contexts than the represen-
tative parliamentary democracy. Second, it lacks a sys-
tematic comparative perspectivewhich allows one to val-
idate findings across a medium-large number of cases.
This article aims to close the resultant gap in CL lit-
erature regarding the CL phenomenon in the context of
direct democracy and identify under which conditions or
configuration of conditions CL is successful or unsuccess-
ful in the direct democratic arena by using a systematic
comparative analysis on a medium number of cases.
From Joppke’s suggestions it is possible to ascertain
that the representative democratic arena is particularly
open to various forms of CL. Nevertheless, this may not
be the same case for the direct democratic arena where
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the characteristics of the political debate and political ac-
tors involved are different. The CL process differs from
other democratic decision-making processes because in
the direct democratic procedure, the consent of the pop-
ulation plays a central role in deliberating policies. There-
fore, the population itself constitutes an additional veto
player, which couldmake significant policy changesmore
difficult to achieve than in the representative demo-
cratic context.
An implication of this is that the direct democratic
arena may be less prone to CL than the representative
democratic arena is. This article individuates themost ap-
propriate formulas that indicate which strategies are suc-
cessful and which conditions lead to the CL failure. The
results, other than stimulating the normative debate on
the decision-making procedure of the direct democratic
system, offer the opportunity to CL promoters to compre-
hend which strategies to adopt to achieve their political
goals by popular vote.
I decided to focus the analysis on the most homoge-
neous subfield in terms of the extension of citizenship
rights in the direct democratic context. Specifically, I an-
alyzed Swiss popular votes related to the rights of foreign-
ers to vote and/or be elected. The extension of political
right to foreigners is a subfield of CL because when po-
litical rights are given to non-citizens, political participa-
tion shifts from an exclusive form to an inclusive one that
is not based on nationhood but rather on a universal di-
mension of citizenship rights.
The Swiss context plays an important role from a the-
oretical perspective, given that these types of CL poli-
cies in Switzerland have always been subject to a popular
vote and have never been implemented through the rep-
resentative democratic process. In this respect, the Swiss
context can be considered as an ideal-typical example of
CL in the context of the direct democratic arena.
In order to address this context, I identified a to-
tal of five theoretically-informed causal conditions that
explain citizenship liberalization and popular vote out-
comes. I then located these five conditions in two con-
figurational hypotheses. Finally, I used fuzzy-set qualita-
tive comparative analysis (fsQCA) in order to test condi-
tions and hypotheses on 39 CL popular votes which in-
volved the extension of political rights to non-citizens in
the Swiss cantons.
2. Specific Cases that Will Be Analysed
The population of cases was built using information gath-
ered from the database of the Centre for Research on
Direct Democracy (http://www.c2d.ch). I have focused
the study on both a specific homogeneous geographical
area and jurisdiction level: Switzerland and the cantonal
level, respectively (in Appendix A the referendums list).
The Swiss cantonal cases differ from the degree of po-
litical rights extension object. These differences are due
to the specific Swiss socio-cultural context and to the le-
gal characteristic of Swiss referendums.
The differences in the object’s content are due to
specific circumstantial elements which are intrinsic to
the Swiss context, characterized by different types of
cleavages that separate cantons. According to the cleav-
age approach (Bartolini & Mair, 1990, pp. 213–220),
the population is separated by certain ascriptive socio-
cultural elements. These ascriptive elements are sources
of normative values that add a sense of collective
identity and determine the attitudinal characteristics
of a group. In Switzerland, scholars individuated em-
pirical evidence of the existence of linguistic cleav-
age between French-speaking and German-speaking
Switzerland (Kriesi, 1998a) and religious cleavage be-
tween Protestant and Catholic areas (Caramani, 2004,
p. 273; Goldberg & Sciarini, 2014); cleavage was also
found between rural and urban zones (Kriesi, 1998b), in
class differences between blue- andwhite-collar workers
(Kriesi, 1998b), and in new classes difference between
the so called losers and winners of globalization (Giugni
& Sciarini, 2008; Goldberg & Sciarini, 2014). These cleav-
ages are sources of normative common values and be-
liefs that contribute to building identity within social
groups and around which both the elite and the elec-
torate organize their action. The difference in the object
might be related to the diverse social sensibility of the ref-
erendums’ promoters toward immigration and national
identity topics (Eugster & Strijbis, 2011) and the diverse
perception of the direct democratic instruments of pop-
ular votes. Such diversity is due to differences in demo-
cratic participatory models (Bühlmann, Vatter, Dlabac, &
Schaub, 2014) and explains why the reforms are gener-
ally more radical in certain cantons, such as Neuchâtel or
Geneva, than in others, such as Appenzell Ausserrhoden
or Graubünden.
In addition to the cleavage perspective, differences
in object content are also related to the typology of the
referendum. The Swiss popular vote system includes four
typologies of direct democratic instruments:
1) The mandatory referendum, which is a required,
binding, and non-popular initiated vote; these ref-
erendums are usually held on important matters
such as a constitutional amendment;
2) The facultative referendum, which is binding, pop-
ular initiated and not a required vote; these refer-
endums aim to oppose a law proposed and voted
on by the parliament;
3) The popular initiative, which is binding, popular
initiated and not a required vote; these refer-
endums aim to introduce a new constitutional
amendment;
4) The counterproposal to the popular initiative,
which is binding, non-popular initiated and a non-
required referendum on a similar object of the
popular initiative.
The popular votes under my investigation all refer to
mandatory referendums, popular initiated referendums,
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 410–426 411
and counterproposals. The most radical forms of polit-
ical rights extension are proposed during popular initi-
ated referendums, as this type of referendum does not
need the consensus of themajority of the political actors
to be held but rather can be requested by a small group
of citizens.
3. Research Question
This article seeks to answer the following question: “un-
der which combinations of conditions are attempts to ex-
tend political rights to foreigners by popular vote success-
ful or unsuccessful?”
The focus is of this study is to individuate the causal
frames that lead to the referendums’ success or fail-
ure. I presume that there is more than one path that
leads to the outcome. This implies a complex reality in
which causal conditions are not separate entities but of-
ten works in conjunction with set theoretic manner.
Essentially, the hypothetical framework to which I re-
fer, presumes a non-linear causal ontology which relies
on the concepts of sufficiency and necessity. This type
of causal ontology has a holistic understanding of cau-
sation which implies the existence of a deterministic re-
ality. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the
meaning of deterministic reality here merely indicates
the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions, and
not to the presence of certainty or absence of error in
the results.
4. Conditions Selection
The conditions selection process is linked to two specific
elements strictly related to the type of study conducted
in this article.
The first element refers to the nature of the object at
stake which can be analysed by using conditions linked
to the CL or direct democratic literature. In relation to
this I have decided to consider both literatures in order
to have a wider understanding of the phenomenon un-
der analysis.
The second element refers to the typology of condi-
tion that should have a well-defined nature in order to
answer the research question. Thismeans that theymust
have a qualitative threshold below which the effect does
not occur, and according to previous studies, they should
be determinative in terms of sufficiency and necessity for
the outcome. The implication of this second element is
to exclude conditions which consider the probability of
occurrence of an outcome to be dependent on the de-
gree of the condition and conditions whose causal effect
are already covered by other conditions.
4.1. Government Ideology
The literature has often claimed that the enfranchise-
ment of resident aliens is affected by party ideology.
Governments composed predominantly of leftist parties
tend to provide more inclusive and generous citizenship
policies than rightist governments (Bird, Saalfeld,&Wüst,
2010; Green, 2005; Janoski, 2010). Meanwhile, strong
rightist governments tend to restrict citizenship rights
(Joppke, 2003) in order to accommodate xenophobic
movements (Joppke, 2008, p. 166). This condition im-
plies that rightist governments alone are not sufficient
for CL opposition.
4.2. Far-Right Populist Parties
According to Howard (2010), anti-immigrant and xeno-
phobic sentiments pre-exist within the population, and
populist parties are the catalyst which mobilize these
sentiments. Strong right-wing populist parties are a nec-
essary and sufficient condition that prevents citizenship
liberalization (Howard, 2010, pp. 735–751). Howard de-
scribes a non-symmetrical relationship, in which the
absence of the strong right-wing populism is a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for CL (Howard,
2010, p. 747).
4.3. Popular Initiated Referendums
The legal characteristics of a popular vote can influence
the vote’s outcome. As previously indicated, mandatory
referendums are instruments that allow citizens to de-
cide on particular policies adopted by the political au-
thorities; meanwhile, popular initiatives are instruments
that enable parts of the population to enforce popu-
lar votes that may go against the will of parliamentary
majorities (Freitag & Vatter, 2006). In our specific con-
text, the popular initiative usually proposed more radi-
cal policies on the extension of political rights to foreign-
ers, transversal to the Swiss socio-cultural cleavages. This
condition is a prerequisite for popular vote failure. More-
over, in Switzerland, the success rate of popular initia-
tives is under 10% (Setälä, 2009, p. 49), which is already a
quasi-sufficient condition for the failure of popular votes.
In addition, Kriesi (2006, pp. 605–606) observes that the
government succeeds whenever it opposes a popular ini-
tiative. Therefore, in the context of popular initiatives,
the opposition of the government is a sufficient and nec-
essary factor for an initiative’s failure.
4.4. Popular Votes with Single or Multiple Issues
Popular votes with multiple issues (those that gather to-
gether several policies into a single referendum ques-
tion) and those with single issues (those that address
only specific policies in the referendum question) can be-
have in differentways. Popular voteswithmultiple issues
have a better chance of passing because the complex-
ity of the vote can reduce the sensitive object’s salience
(Ginsburg, 2009, p. 3). In such cases, CL matters can be
hidden inside a broad bill and the political elite can better
control the propaganda related to the bill. In contrast, a
single-issue popular vote on CL policy has a lower chance
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of passing because the salience of the CL matters would
be high (Cooter & Gilbert, 2010, p. 745). In the Swiss con-
text, multiple-issue popular votes only refer to manda-
tory referendums, while single-issue popular votes can
be proposed in mandatory referendums, popular initia-
tives, or counterproposals.
4.5. Political Elite: Split or Cohesive
The degree of polarization of the political elite influences
the outcome of a popular vote: the more fragmented
the political elite is on the issue put to popular vote, the
less likely the citizens are to agree with the government
(Kriesi, 2006, pp. 601–602). This hypothesis has a sym-
metrical nature; when all parties are unified in favor of
a proposal, a one-sided information flow exists and the
elites will be more persuasive (Ray, 1999, p. 298).
5. Expected Causal Configurations
The five conditions established above are divided into
two groups:
i) The conditions government ideology and pres-
ence/absence of strong far-right populist parties
belong to the group of CL literature’s conditions
that explains CL restriction or extension in the sole
context of representative democracy;
ii) The conditions popular initiatives opposed by the
government, multiple-issue referendum, and elite
cohesive or split belong to the group of general di-
rect democracy literature that explains the popu-
lar vote’s success or failure.
These two groups of conditions are circumstantial to
their specific contexts; none of them fully explain the
specific context of CL extension or restriction in a di-
rect democracy. Likewise, the outcome of interest can
be explained by a configuration of those conditions re-
lated to the CL literature and those related to the direct
democratic literature. Therefore, the potential explana-
tions expressed in the conditions contain both elements
that have been discovered in the context of representa-
tive democracy and those that are important only in the
context of direct democracy. The presence of both ele-
ments highlights the fact that even when the final deci-
sion is made in a direct democratic fashion, the political
process involves elements of both representative and di-
rect democracy.
As a result, the nature of the phenomenon under
our investigation is configurative; the use of such an ap-
proach allows us to obtain the set of potential config-
urations of conditions that can combine the two differ-
ent groups of conditions outlined above. In relation to
this approach, we believe that our outcome of interest
would be best understood in terms of configurative cau-
sation rather than the average causal effects of variables
across cases.
5.1. Expected Configurations in CL Success in the
Context of Direct Democracy
In the direct democratic system, the consent of the pop-
ulation plays a central role because without it, policies
can be blocked or delayed. Therefore, when trying to
amend new policies during the popular voting process,
both the government and the parliamentary majority
must consider the population as a new veto player. CL
policies may be easily subject to the voters’ veto due to
pre-existent negative attitudes toward aliens (Howard,
2010), the presence of difference socio-cultural cleavage
or, as pointed out by Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007,
pp. 105–106) and Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse and
Wood (1995), because of the less-liberal attitude toward
cultural diversity and policy change of the electorate
compared to themore-liberal representative democratic
actors. As result, in the representative democratic arena
political outcomes can deviate from voters’ preferences,
which is not the case in the direct democratic arena given
that voters themselves are called upon to express their
preferences on the outcome.
The hurdles posed by the direct democratic arena
and the explanations expressed in the conditions con-
tain elements of both the representative and the direct
democratic arenas; such elements are translated into
a complex configurative combination of conditions that
work together in order to achieve CL success. Therefore,
in relation to the outcome “CL success” during referen-
dum,we expect configurations of conditionswith at least
one element coming from the group of CL conditions
and an element coming from the group of direct demo-
cratic conditions.
The configurational hypotheses consider the direct
democratic hurdles as having a central role. CL promot-
ers must adopt complex political strategies in order to
pass a CL bill. I have identified two such strategies: 1) the
open strategy, and 2) the hidden strategy.
In the open strategy, CL issues are openly debated
during the referendum campaign. Considering the vot-
ers’ veto role in the direct democratic arena, promot-
ers of CL policies should provide a one-sided influx of in-
formation (without strong opposition) in order convince
voters about the CL object. In these circumstances, the
CL promoters will seek elite cohesion in order to cre-
ate little to no opposition to CL and positively influence
the voters’ preferences on the issue; however, the ab-
sence of far-right populist parties is also necessary in or-
der to avoid conflicts over the CL reform. In these circum-
stances, CL promoters can decide to pose the CL issue in
the form of a referendum question with little fear that
the CL policy will be considered unpopular by voters. In-
deed, the strong elite’s propaganda in favor of CL and the
absence of mobilizing actors that could activate latent
xenophobic and anti-immigration sentiments would lead
voters to accept the bill.
The open strategy leads to the following configura-
tional hypothesis:
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Configurational Hypothesis 1 (CH1): absence of pop-
ulist parties (∼POP) AND elite cohesion (ELITE) AND
non-popular initiative (∼INI).1
This configurational hypothesis considers that CL can
be achieved if a cohesive elite can introduce the issue
without being afraid of resistance from a populist right-
wing party.
CL promoters might also adopt a hidden strategy
of communication in order to pass the bill. In this con-
text, CL’s promoters fear the possible mobilization of
pre-existent xenophobic sentiments among the popula-
tion. Basically, left-wing governments, as main promot-
ers of CL policies, are aware that voters might stop the
bill because of their conservative attitudes on this type
of object. Therefore, these governments might decide
to avoid informing voters about the bill’s content in or-
der to minimize the risk that the voters would focus
on the sensitive issue in the campaign (Besley & Coate,
2008; Ginsburg, 2009). This strategy also reduces conflict
among political actors during the referendum debate,
given that the issue is not discussed. We define this pos-
sible strategy with the term hidden strategy, given that
the CL issue is hidden inside a broad bill and people are
not aware of the bill’s content.
The hidden strategy leads to the following configura-
tional hypothesis:
Configurational Hypothesis 2 (CH2): left-wing govern-
ment (LEFT) AND multiple-issue referendum (MULT)
AND non-popular initiated initiative (∼INI).2
This configurational hypothesis considers that CL can be
achieved if a left-wing government includes the issue in
a multiple-issue referendum. In this situation, unpopular
policies would be kept hidden from the people. As a con-
sequence, voters’ preferences would not be determined
by the CL object but by other objects included in the ref-
erendum’s question.
The open strategy and the hidden strategy refer to an
optimistic and a pessimistic view, respectively, of voters’
attitudes toward aliens. Indeed, the open strategy con-
siders voters’ negative sentiments toward aliens as latent
and thereby able to be activated only by an agency factor.
Therefore, in order for the vote to be successful, it is suf-
ficient to deactivate or avoid activating the action of the
agency factor (i.e., populist parties). The hidden strategy
considers that voters’ negative sentiments toward aliens
are already active because they are pre-existent. There-
fore, in order for the vote to succeed, it is important to
avoid activating this pre-existent sentiment by hiding the
issue within a broad bill.
5.2. Expected Configurations in CL Failure in the Context
of Direct Democracy
In relation to the failure of CL, it is assumed that themany
hurdles facing the passage of a bill in a direct democ-
racy are translated into many sufficient conditions which
alone are enough to stop CL. The rejection of a CL bill
in the context of a direct democracy would be relatively
easy due to the hurdles of the direct democratic arena
explained above. In these circumstances, conditions that
explain referendum failure and CL failure in the context
of a representative democratic system are alone suffi-
cient to the failure of the referendum.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): CL bill will fail when it is opposed
by a rightist government (∼LEFT)
Hypothesis 4 (H4): CL bill will fail when it is supported
by a divided government (∼ELITE)
Hypothesis 5 (H5): CL bill will fail when it is opposed
by a strong far-right populist party (POP)
Hypothesis 6 (H6): CL bill will fail when is proposed as
popular initiative (INI)
Hypothesis 7 (H7): CL bill will fail when is put in a
single-issue referendum (∼MULT)3
6. Research Design
In order to test these hypotheses, I decided to use the
fsQCA (Ragin, 2000, 2008). The choice of this method
is primarily linked to configurative ontology and the as-
sumptions of causal asymmetry as set out by the hy-
pothesis above. A configurative ontology presupposes
that conditions can work together in a configurational or
interactive way within a specific theoretical framework.
Meanwhile, causal asymmetry implies that an explana-
tion of the failure of CL reform proposals cannot draw on
simple negations of the factors that explain the success
of CL reform proposals. The alternative outcome of a so-
cial process therefore requires its own explanation.
7. Condition Operationalization
All variables are transformed into sets of values; this
allows one to individuate sufficient and necessary
relationships.
Conditions with a defined nature receive a crisp bi-
nary score of 0 or 1. In this study, these conditions refer
to the outcome of the popular vote (Yes or No), the pres-
ence of a multiple or single object referendum and the
presence of a popular initiated referendum.
Conditions with a non-defined nature receive a fuzzy
set score which is a continuous score between 0 and 1
with a qualitative anchor point at 0.5. The 0.5 anchor
defines the border between case membership and case
non-membership to a condition. In this article, these con-
1 In Boolean terms, it is expected to have this configuration: ∼POP*ELITE*∼INI→CL.
2 In Boolean terms, it is expected to have this configuration: LEFT*MULT*∼INI→CL.
3 In Boolean terms it is expected to have this configuration: ∼LEFT+∼ELITE+POP+INI+∼MULT→∼CL.
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ditions refer to the presence of a leftist or rightist govern-
ment, the presence of strong right populist parties, the
degree of elite division or cohesion.
The Appendix B shows the details of conditions’
calibration.
8. fsQCA in Relation to the Success of Political Rights
Extension
8.1. Necessary Conditions
The analysis of necessity did not uncover any necessary
conditions; therefore, promoters of CL policies cannot
rely on possible crucial conditions in order to succeed
in their purposes. In other words, a direct democratic
system does not provide essential necessary conditions
for CL success, a finding that is in line with our theoreti-
cal expectations. Indeed, the hurdles of the direct demo-
cratic system inevitably hinder possible necessary condi-
tions that would allow CL to succeed in a representative
democratic system. In such circumstances, promoters of
CL policies must therefore not rely on direct democracy
in order to pursue CL extension.
8.2. Sufficient Conditions
The analysis yielded three different solutions: Table 1 dis-
plays the parsimonious solution and Table 2 the inter-
mediate solution. Scholars still debate which solution is
causally interpretable.
Baumgartner (2015) and Thiem (Thiem & Baumgart-
ner, 2016) consider the parsimonious solution to be the
only causally interpretable solution because it eliminates
causally irrelevant factors. Ragin (2008, p. 175) empha-
sized that the intermediate solution is the preferred one,
as it balances parsimony and complexity based on the
substantive and theoretical knowledge of the researcher.
The differences between Baumgartner, Thiem, and Ragin
is that the former understand the intermediate solution
a solution with redundant factors, while the second un-
derstands the intermediate solution as a more speci-
fied solution.
Owing to the lack of agreement among QCA scholars
on which solution term is preferable and causally inter-
pretable, I decided to briefly discuss cases covered by the
intermediate solution formula before producing a final
statement of causal interpretation.
The outcome that explains the CL success by referen-
dum has the following parsimonious solution:
(a) A popular vote with multiple issues (MULT) is
successful;
and the following intermediate solutions:
(a) A popular votewithmultiple policies issues (MULT)
supported and triggered by a cohesive govern-
ment (∼INI*ELITE) is successful;
(b) A popular vote with multiple issues (MULT) sup-
ported and triggered by a rightist government
(∼LEFT*∼INI) is successful.
The condition multiple-issue referendum appears in ev-
ery path of the parsimonious and intermediate solution
formulas.Multiple-issue referendum is also the key factor
that should confirm the hidden strategy hypothesis. The
political elite seems to usemultiple-issue referendums in
order to avoid public discussion on CL during the referen-
dum campaign.
Table 1. Parsimonious solution for referendums success.
Frequency cutoff: 1 / Consistency cutoff: 1
Raw consistency Unique coverage consistency
MULT 0.67 0.67 1
Solution coverage (Ragin): 0.67
Solution Coverage (Veri): 0.83
Solution consistency (Ragin and Veri): 1
Table 2. Intermediate solutions for referendums success.
Frequency cutoff: 1 / Consistency cutoff: 1
Raw consistency Unique coverage consistency
(1) ∼INI*MULT*ELITE (1) 0.44 0.13 (1) 1
(2) ∼LEFT*∼INI*MULT (2) 0.42 (1) 0.11 (2) 1
Solution coverage (Ragin): 0.55
Solution Coverage (Veri): 0.71
Solution consistency (Ragin and Veri): 1
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8.3. Discussion on the Political Rights Extension Success
8.3.1. Sufficient Paths
In this section I briefly discuss cases covered by the inter-
mediate solution formula. Table 3 displays cases covered
by the intermediate solution formula.
Given the high number of cases covered by the solu-
tion paths, I decided to select a reduced number of cases.
As suggested by QCA literature, I selected uniquely cov-
ered cases (Schneider & Rohlfing, 2014), because these
types of cases can be explained by one unique con-
junction of conditions, i.e., there cannot be other expla-
nations for the case’s outcome (Schneider & Rohlfing,
2014). In contrast, cases covered by more than one path
can be explained fromdifferent angles or by a single dom-
inant configuration. This is not an error in interpretation
of the configurations but is instead linked to a specific
QCA understanding of causal relationships built not on
causal mechanisms, but on the counterfactual causal re-
lationship of necessity and sufficiency. As the premise of
the discussion, it is important to point out that all cases
covered by the parsimonious and intermediate solution
formulas refer to total cantonal constitutional revisions.
Path 1: in the case of Basel Stadt 2005 (CHBS05),
a long process of elites meeting (Verfassungsrat—
Constitutional Assembly) preceded thepopular vote. The
Verfassungsrat proposed a total constitutional revision
that could meet the different political expectations of
every political party involved. On March 2005, after six
years of meetings, the elected Constitutional Assembly
reached important inter-party agreements when the fi-
nal constitutional draft was accepted by every party ex-
cept the non-governmental right-wing populist parties of
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and Swiss Democrats (SD).
In this instance, the political elites accepted a constitu-
tional reform which included an article on the possibil-
ity of extension of political rights to foreigners only in
the towns of Riehen and Bettingen (but not in the city
of Basel). The government-elites decided to unanimously
campaign for the constitutional reformwithout revealing
the sensitive CL content to the people. During the refer-
endum campaign, the political elite kept the existence
of a bill on political rights extension to foreigners hidden
from the voters.
Path 2: in CHVD02, the Constitutional Assembly tried
to meet some, but not all, opposing views on extending
political rights to foreigners. On March 2001, the Consti-
tutional Assembly voted for the first time on the exten-
sion of political rights at the cantonal and local level. De-
spite the proposition receiving the majority of consent
(Bolliger, 2001), the assembly members decided to re-
vote on a nuanced version of the same issue in Septem-
ber 2001. This proposal gained greater support with the
Liberal Democratic Party (FDP),which eventually decided
to support the agreement; only the Liberal Party (LPS)
and the relatively weak SVP opposed the constitutional
reforms. During the political campaign, the CL object
played a secondary role. The campaign actively focused
not only on the extension of political rights, but also on
the extension of social rights (such as the right to mater-
nity insurance), the union of Church and State, and the
reduction of the cantonal districts from 19 to 10 (Rychen,
2002). In Fribourg 2004 (CHFR04), the primary issue dis-
cussed during the referendum campaign was the article
on civil unions for homosexuals and not the reform of
foreigners’ political rights. In both CHVD02 and CHFR04,
the CL object played only a secondary role andwas subtly
hidden by the presence of other priority objects.
From these three cases it is possible to identify two
types of hidden strategies that differ in degree: i) a hard-
hidden strategy, and ii) a soft-hidden strategy. The hard-
hidden strategy refers to CHBS05, inwhich the unpopular
CL object was never mentioned during the propaganda
campaign. The soft-hidden strategy refers to CHVD02
and CHFR04, where the unpopular CL object played only
a secondary role and was subtly hidden by the presence
of other priority objects.
8.3.2. Causal Interpretation on Political Rights Extension
Success
The hidden strategy has been determined to be the
causally relevant strategy for CL promoters to reach suc-
cess in CL policies; configurational Hypothesis 2 (CH2) is
therefore confirmed even if some unexpected elements
exist. In contrast to CH2, the solution formula does not
display left-wing government as a causally relevant con-
dition in the referendum’s success, as constitutional revi-
sions allow for great support on the issue from different
political forces (including right-wing parties). The specific
circumstance of a total constitutional revision is already
sufficient to reduce the CL-related divergences of the ac-
tors participating in the direct democratic arena.
As previously observed, the hidden strategy hypoth-
esis has a pessimistic understanding of the electorate’s
Table 3. Causal configurations for referendums success.
Solution formula Cases non-uniquely covered Cases uniquely covered
(1) ∼INI*MULT*ELITE CHAR95, CHNE00, CHGR03 CHBS05
(2) ∼LEFT*∼INI*MULT CHAR95, CHNE00, CHGR03 CHVD02; CHFR04
Cases not covered by the solution formula
CHGE05.1; CHNE07.2; CHJU14
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behavior as a veto player. Indeed, this strategy suggests
that the sole explicit reference to a CL issue in the refer-
endum question is enough for the population to act as a
veto player toward the CL reform. As suggested by the so-
lution formula, in the hidden strategy voters’ preferences
would not be determined by the CL object. Essentially, in
a multi-issue referendum, voters would not exert their
veto power over the CL object because the salience of
the unpopular object would have been reduced. In this
strategy, voters would not be aware of the existence
of the CL reform, or when they were aware, such as in
CHVD02 and CHFR04, they would be required to priori-
tize their preferences across a range of different topics.
The causal core of the hidden strategy is condition
MULT. The fact that the CL object was hidden during the
referendum campaign supports the causal inference of
the MULT condition on the outcome. In the specific con-
text of a total constitutional revision, the elite cohesion
(ELITE) and the presence of a mandatory referendum
(∼INI) are definitional elements of themultiple-issue ref-
erendum (MULT) and have no causal inference on the
outcome of referendum success. The cases’ observations
corroborate Thiem and Baumgartner’s assumptions of
the parsimonious solution: conditions ELITE and∼INI are
redundant. Essentially, multiple-issue referendum is the
Boolean difference maker, and can be considered the
only non-redundant and causal factor that explains the
outcome of CL success in the context of extending politi-
cal right to foreigners.
9. fsQCA Analysis for the Failure of Political Rights
Extension in the Context of Direct Democracy
9.1. Necessary Conditions for Political Rights Extension
Failure
Single-issue referendum (∼MULT) is the necessary condi-
tion for citizenship liberalization failure in a direct democ-
racy; the failure of the extension of foreigners’ voting
rights would not occur without this crucial condition.
This result corroborates the initial hypothesis: CL resis-
tance finds fewer hurdles in the context of direct democ-
racy than CL extension. Indeed, a sole explicit reference
to a CL issue in the referendum question is necessary for
the voters to activate their negative attitudes toward CL
and therefore act as a veto player toward the referen-
dum. Moreover, the necessary condition single-issue ref-
erendum also provides the ideal context for increasing
conflict between the actors involved in the direct demo-
cratic debate. Whenever the explicit question on CL re-
form is put up for direct democratic debate, an ideolog-
ical conflict over the issue at stake is difficult to avoid.
Essentially, the context of the single-issue referendum
question enables the actors involved to express their po-
litical views about CL during the referendum debate.
9.2. Sufficient Conditions for Political Rights Extension
Failure
As displayed in Table 4, the parsimonious sufficient solu-
tion for the outcome “failure of political rights extension
to foreigners” encompasses two different causal combi-
nations of conditions; meanwhile, as displayed in Table 5
the intermediate sufficient solution encompasses three
different causal combinations of conditions.
Ragin (2006) and Veri (2019) consistency is high,
whichmeans that nearly all the cases fit into the patterns
identified by the analysis; Ragin’s (2006) and Veri’s (2018)
coverages are also high, which makes the solution empir-
ically relevant and not trivial.
The parsimonious solution suggests that a popular
vote will fail whenever the following criteria exist:
(a) Strong populist parties (POP) that oppose a single-
issue (∼MULT) popular vote promoted by a divided
rightist government (∼ELITE*∼LEFT);
(b) A popular initiative (INI) referendum held on CL.
Meanwhile, the intermediate solution suggests that a
popular vote will fail whenever the following criteria
exist:
(a) Strong populist parties (POP) that oppose a single-
issue (∼MULT) popular vote promoted by a divided
rightist government (∼ELITE*∼LEFT);
(b) A rightist government (∼LEFT) in which unified
elites (∼ELITE) oppose a single-issue (∼MULT) pop-
ular initiative (INI);
(c) A strong populist party (POP) which opposes a
single-issue (∼MULT) popular initiative (INI).
Table 4. Parsimonious solution for political rights extension failure.
Frequency cutoff: 2 / Consistency cutoff: 0.819642
Raw consistency Unique coverage consistency
(1) ∼LEFT*POP*∼MULT*∼ELITE (1) 0.33 (1) 0.13 (1) 0.92
(2) INI (2) 0.62 (2) 0.42 (2) 1
Solution coverage (Ragin): 0.75
Solution Coverage (Veri): 0.83
Solution consistency (Ragin and Veri): 0.96
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Table 5. Intermediate solution for political rights extension failure.
Frequency cutoff: 2 / Consistency cutoff: 0.819642
Raw consistency Unique coverage consistency
(1) ∼LEFT*POP*∼MULT*∼ELITE (1) 0.33 (1) 0.13 (1) 0.92
(2) ∼LEFT*INI*∼MULT (2) 0.42 (2) 0.08 (2) 1
(3) POP*INI*∼MULT (3) 0.42 (3) 0.1 (3) 1
Solution coverage (Ragin): 0.66
Solution Coverage (Veri): 0.83
Solution consistency (Ragin and Veri): 0.96
The first path is identical in both the parsimonious and in-
termediate solutions, meaning that each insufficient but
non-redundant part of a condition which is itself an un-
necessary but sufficient component of the causal config-
uration is a Boolean difference maker.
9.3. Discussion on the Political Rights Extension Failure
In order to determine whether intermediate solution
conditions are redundant, cases uniquely covered by
the intermediate solution formula are briefly discussed.
Table 6 displays cases covered by the intermediate solu-
tion formula.
Even before discussing the intermediate solution
paths, the condition single-issue referendum (∼MULT)
can be declared redundant in conjunction with popular
initiatives opposed by the government (INI), given that in
the specific context of Switzerland popular initiatives can
be held only on single objects.
Path 1 does not present any causally redundant
condition, given that it appears exactly how it is in
both the intermediate and the parsimonious solution.
In Path 1, voters opposed the proposition supported by
the government. The case of Bern (CHBE94.2) refers to
a government counterproposal to the popular initiative
CHBE94.1, which was voted on the same day in Parlia-
ment and in the ballot. In the counterproposal, CL issues
were actively debated during the referendum campaign.
Evidence exists that the right-wing populist parties used
anti-foreigner arguments, which indicates a causal role
of condition POP. Indeed, during the campaign, the SVP
highlighted the risk to Switzerland of losing cultural ho-
mogeneity in institutions due to foreigners’ inability to
properly speak the Swiss German dialect. In the middle
of the campaign, the FDP suddenly decided to oppose
the counterproposal (Kiefer, 1994; Van Liniger, 1994).
The FDP’s decision came only after they had already of-
fered support for the counterproposal both in Parliament
and at the beginning of the referendum campaign. The
referendum held in Schaffhausen (CHSH01) was a vari-
ant of the total constitutional revision also voted on the
same day by FDP. During the parliamentary debate, the
FDP favored the extension of political rights to foreign-
ers, but subsequently followed the SVP in the political
campaign against the referendum (SDA/ATS, 2000).
Path 2: in the cases of Geneva 1993 (CHGE93.1 and
CHGE93.2) and Uri (CHUR95), the cantonal governments
ran a campaign primarily focused on small-step policies
toward CL, and therefore opposed the popular initiatives
only because they were considered too radical to have a
chance to pass by popular vote. The government cam-
paign was not focused on the CL matter.
Path 3: in Bern (CHBE10), populist party SVP’s opin-
ion on the initiative was moderate and not discernible
from the government opinion on the popular initiative.
The popular initiative campaign against the referendum
was run by a single committee composed of the SVP, the
Conservative Democratic Party (BDP), the Federal Demo-
cratic Union (EDU), and the FDP, which proposed a uni-
fying strategy of propaganda (Wyler, 2010). The SVP, to-
gether with the right-wing parties in the government, ar-
gued that extending voting rights to foreigners should
not be a tool of integration but a consequence of the in-
tegration process (Guggisberg, 2010). Indeed, naturaliza-
Table 6. Cases covered by the intermediate solution.
Solution formula Cases non-uniquely covered Cases uniquely covered
(1) ∼∼LEFT*POP*∼MULT*ELITE CHBE94.2; CHGE01; CHSH01
(2) ∼LEFT*∼INI*MULT CHVD92, CHZH93, CHBE94.1, CHBS94, CHGE93.1, CHGE93.2, CHUR95
CHAG96, CHFR97, CHSO97, CHGL10,
CHVD11, CHLU11, CHZH13, CHSH14
(3) POP*INI*∼MULT CHVD92, CHZH93, CHBE94.1, CHBS94, CHNE07.1, CHBS10.1, CHBE10
CHAG96, CHFR97, CHSO97, CHGL10,
CHVD11, CHLU11, CHZH13, CHSH14
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tion was considered the only official tool to guarantee
that a person will be integrated and that s/he can un-
derstand the society and the language where s/he lives.
In Basel (CHBS10.1) and Neuchâtel (CHNE07.1), the pop-
ulist party was an additional actor to the government ac-
tion in opposing the popular initiative. For example, in
the case of Basel, the SVP’s arguments were based on
strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments; the
group used street posters with figures of a woman wear-
ing burqa, a young black man with sunglasses, and a
suspicious-looking Arabic man in front of the ballot box
with the cantonal flag (Weber, 2010). The examination
of these specific cases highlights the fact that the condi-
tion POP is not uniformly causally related to the outcome.
The fact that in Basel and Neuchâtel the condition POP
is causally relevant and in Bern it is causally redundant
indicates that the solution formula does not provide a
full satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon un-
der investigation. Essentially, from a set-theoretic per-
spective, this ambiguity is not acceptable because the
condition POP appears to be an Insufficient but Neces-
sary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but
Sufficient (INUS condition) over certain cases, but not in
other cases. Therefore, POP should be considered a re-
dundant condition because statements of sufficiency are
not fulfilled with the intermediate solution formula.
As has been discussed in this section, the conditions
that only appear in the intermediate solutions are redun-
dant either because they are not relevant (as in the case
of right-wing governments in CHGE93.1 CHGE93.2) or
because they provide ambiguous evidence (such as the
presence of populist actors in CHBE10, CHBS10.1, and
CHNE07.1.). As a result, the parsimonious solution path
INI (presence of popular initiative) has been determined
to be the only non-redundant solution formula.
9.4. Causal Interpretation of Political Rights Extension
Failure
The sufficient and necessary conditions corroborate the
principle behind our hypothesis on CL failure, which con-
siders the non-acceptance of a CL bill to be relatively easy
due to the presence of the hurdles of the direct demo-
cratic arena. Indeed, the presence of the necessary con-
dition single-issue referendum and the sufficient condi-
tions activates the negative attitude of the population
toward the reform and increases conflict among politi-
cal actors.
The solution formulas also suggest the same pes-
simistic view of voters on CL matters, given that the
mere presence of a question on a CL issue plays a nec-
essary role in the activation of the voters’ veto power.
In Path 1, the presence of strong populist actor and a di-
vided government deprives the government of the nec-
essary resources to influence voters’ preferences on the
issue through a strong one-sided influx of information. In
Path 2, the popular initiative object itself, which is always
a single issue, and as pointed out above is more radical
and transversal to the various socio-cultural cleavages, is
sufficient to trigger the veto power of the electorate to-
ward the popular vote.
Parsimonious solution paths corroborate that CL re-
forms are opposed by the voters because of the high
level of conflict inherent in the direct democratic arena.
Indeed, in the first path, the conflict is inflated by the
presence of populist parties and by a divided govern-
ment. Populist parties raise the level of conflict inside
the government during the referendum campaign, which
is an interactive condition that triggers the elite split.
Meanwhile, in the second Path, the conflict is high due
to the absence of a deliberative arena (such as the par-
liament), which would allow compromises to be found
between the popular vote promoters and other political
actors; such deliberation could also increase support for
the popular vote. The popular initiative condition INI is by
itself sufficient for popular vote failure because popular
initiatives are a more divisive vector of policy promotion
than mandatory or counterproposal referendums. This
divisiveness occurs because the promoters of popular ini-
tiatives decide to put the object as it is to a popular vote
without engaging in consensus negotiations with the po-
litical elite. In a popular initiative, support for the ob-
ject is usually limited to the popular initiative’s promot-
ers, which implies substantial opposition from the gov-
ernment and other political actors. Basically, popular ini-
tiatives provide little to no room for deliberation among
the political actors involved. In contrast, counterproposal
and mandatory referendums are usually subject to a leg-
islative deliberation process in which the political actors’
conflicts are reduced; in such circumstances, the major-
ity of the parliament usually must agree on the object to
be put into referendum.
10. Conclusion
This article demonstrates that a systemwith direct demo-
cratic instruments is open to introducing CL reform pro-
posals; however, such a system also makes it almost
impossible to gain the majority of the established elec-
torate’s support for such reforms. If the lightening of cit-
izenship is to be approved by those who possess the sta-
tus of a citizen (i.e., nationals), the CL object must be
hidden from public scrutiny and embedded in a general
constitutional reform. For supporters of CL, this study
contains two further messages: introducing CL either
through a popular initiative or in a situation in which a
strong far-right populist party will stimulate a right-wing
government party to oppose the initiative is a recipe for
failure in the direct democratic context.
This research also suggests a pessimistic view of vot-
ers’ behavior toward CL reforms. The visibility of the
object plays a central role, while at the same time the
level of conflict between political actors involved in the
direct democratic arena contributes to the referendum
outcome.When the object is not visible to the voters and
the level of conflict is reduced, the voters will accept the
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object; meanwhile, when the CL object is visible to the
voters and the level of conflict is high, the voters will op-
pose the object and exert their veto power.
This conceptualization also indicates that conflicts
and the nature of the object aremutually dependent in a
direct democracy. Indeed, only the conjunction of these
two axes produce the outcome of interest; condition(s)
located along these two axes are not enough to produce
the outcome of interest.
This research also contains certain limitations due to
the fsQCA methodology and the research design used
that have affected the interpretation of findings. Specifi-
cally, the fsQCA analysis usually produces solution formu-
las that rarely cover the whole population of cases ana-
lyzed; as a result, there are cases that are not covered by
the solution formulas. The cases that remain uncovered
can probably be explained by other conditions that have
not been considered by our explanatory model. In order
to identify such conditions, further specific case analysis
should be conducted. Moreover, the fsQCA analysis only
produces causal static statements on sufficiency and ne-
cessity; it does not add inferential value by tracing how
the combination of necessary and sufficient conditions
affects the outcomes. In other words, the fsQCA analy-
sis identifies sufficient and necessary conditions but not
how these conditions interact to produce the outcome
of interest. The temporary succession of conditions and
the causal mechanisms that link the conditions together
and lead to the outcome remain unexplained. Finally, the
fsQCA analysis reveals statements of sufficiency and ne-
cessity with only the conditions available in the explana-
torymodel, implying that itmight be possible tomiss con-
ditions that might not appear in the solution formula.
Despite the limitations represented by the employed
method, this research provides a comprehensive picture
of the fate of CL proposals in the context of direct democ-
racy by bringing to the forefront the question of CL in the
context of direct democracy and identifying non-trivial
sufficient and necessary conditions for the success or fail-
ure of CL policy in the direct democratic context.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Referendum List
Table A1. Popular votes on extension of political rights to foreigners.
Popular votes Date Case ID Result
Neuchatel RE at LOC (referendum) 1990 CHNE90 No
Vaud VR and RE at CANT and LOC (initiative) 1992 CHVD92 No
Geneva VR at LOC (initiative) 1993 CHGE93.1 No
Geneva VR and RE in Tribunals (counterproposal) 1993 CHGE93.2 No
Geneva VR and RE at LOC (initiative) 1993 CHGE93.3 No
Zurich VR at LOC (initiative) 1993 CHZH93 No
Bern VR and RE at CANT and LOC (initiative) 1994 CHBE94.1 No
Bern VR and RE at LOC (counterproposal) 1994 CHBE94.2 No
Basel Stadt VR at CANT and LOC (initiative) 1994 CHBS94 No
Uri VR at CANT (initiative) 1995 CHUR95 No
Appenzell AR VR/RE at LOC (referendum) 1995 CHAR95 Yes
Aargau VR and RE at LOC (initiative) 1996 CHAG96 No
Jura RE at LOC (referendum) 1996 CHJU96 No
Fribourg VR and RE at LOC (initiative) 1997 CHFR97 No
Solothurn VR and RE at CANT and LOC (initiative) 1997 CHSO97 No
Neuchâtel VR at CANT (referendum) 2000 CHNE00 Yes
Geneva VR and RE at LOC (referendum) 2001 CHGE01 No
Schaffhausen VR at LOC (referendum) 2001 CHSH01 No
Vaud VR and RE at LOC (referendum) 2002 CHVD02 Yes
Graubünden VR/RE at LOC (referendum) 2003 CHGR03 Yes
Fribourg VR/RE at LOC (referendum) 2004 CHFR04 Yes
Basel-Stadt VR/RE at LOC (referendum) 2005 CHBS05 Yes
Geneva VR at LOC (initiative) 2005 CHGE05.1 Yes
Geneva VR and RE at LOC (initiative) 2005 CHGE05.2 No
Solothurn VR and RE at LOC (referendum) 2005 CHSO05 No
Jura RE at LOC (referendum) 2007 CHJU07 No
Neuchâtel VR and RE at CANT (initiative) 2007 CHNE07.1 No
Neuchâtel RE at LOC (counterproposal) 2007 CHNE07.2 Yes
Glarus VR and RE at LOC and CANT (referendum) 2010 CHGL10 No
Basel Stadt VR and RE at LOC (initiative) 2010 CHBS10.1 No
Basel Stadt VR at LOC (counterproposal) 2010 CHBS10.2 No
Bern VR and RE at LOC (initiative) 2010 CHBE10 No
Vaud VR and RE at CANT (initiative) 2011 CHVD11 No
Lucerne VR at LOC (initiative) 2011 CHLU11 No
Zurich VR and RE at LOC (initiative) 2013 CHZH13 No
Jura VR and RE at LOC (referendum) 2014 CHJU14 Yes
Schaffhausen VR and RE at LOC and CANT (initiative) 2014 CHSH14 No
Neuchatel RE at CANT (referendum) 2016 CHNE16 No
Basel Land VR at LOC and CANT (initiative) 2018 CHBL18 No
Notes: VR: voting rights; RE: right to be elected; CANT: cantonal level; LOC: local level.
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Appendix B. Calibration Procedure Details
(for raw data please request information to the author)
1. Outcome Calibration (OUT, ∼OUT)
Table B1. Coding scheme crisp set OUT and ∼OUT.
Crisp score Outcome Condition ID
1 Yes OUT
0 No ∼OUT
2. Left Wing Government Calibration (LEFT, ∼LEFT)
The condition left-wing (LEFT) versus rightwing (∼LEFT) government has a fuzzy set membership.
The full membership of 1 means coincides with the ideal typical leftwing government; meanwhile the full non-mem-
bership 0 coincides with the ideal type of rightwing government.
Government cabinet
Government ideology fuzzy score
Party (x1) ideology fuzzy score
(step 1)
Step 2Party (X2) ideology fuzzy score
(step 1)
Party (Xn) ideology fuzzy score
(step 1)
Figure B1. Government ideology final fuzzy score.
I decided to calibrate the ideology of the government in two steps. (i) Firstly I calibrated each government party’s ideology
fuzzy score (data used are from the Sotomo Institute of Zurich); (ii) then I aggregated these scores considering the party
government composition by using the Arithmetic Mean Based on Compensatory Fuzzy Logic as suggested by Bouchet,
Pastore, Andrade, Brun and Ballarin (2011) and Veri (2017).
Table B2. Sotomo Institute data scores coding.
fs score Sotomo Score Condition ID
1 −51 (−60) LEFT
0,5 0 ——————
0 51–60 ∼LEFT
3. Strong Populist party calibration (POP, ∼POP)
The condition strong far right populist parties (POP) versus non-populist parties (∼POP) has a fuzzy set membership. I con-
sider right wing populist parties the Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People Party—SVP), the Eidgenossisch-Demokrati-
sche Union (Federal Democratic Union—EDU), the Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz (Freedom Party of Switzerland—AP-FPS),
the Schweizer Demokraten (Swiss Democrats—SD) and theMouvement Citoyens Genevois (Geneva Citizens’ Movement—
MCR).
The full membership of 1 coincides with the ideal typical presence of strong far-right populist parties; meanwhile the
full non-membership 0 coincides with the ideal type of absence of strong far-right populist parties.
This condition has a complex definition which has to be adapted to our scope. Therefore, in order to fuzzify this condi-
tion, I decided to use the Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Condition (FMAC) strategy (Veri 2017).
From the theory it is possible to extrapolate at least two attributes related to our FMAC: 1) the strength of the populist
party inside the country and 2) the political agenda of the populist party, which must be far right and anti-immigration.
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A third element of our FMAC is determined by the causal context itself, or the CL related referendum’s context. In such
context, despite that the theory only required strong far right populism I added the position of each populist party in
respect of the referendums. This attribute also has the role of activating the whole condition POP in the context of direct
democracy. Indeed, the outcomemay change depending on whether a given populist party participates in the propaganda
against CL or not.
In summary our FMAC is made by 3 distinctive attributes that are necessary and jointly sufficient in determining the
final concept. These attributes are:
i) the electoral strength of the populist party,
The electoral strength has been measured by considering each populist party electoral performance during the elec-
tion that precede the referendum. I have defined the qualitative breakpoints 0.5 at 4%.
Table B3. Coding scheme fuzzy set POP electoral strength.




ii) far-right political agenda:
The empirical information is collected from the Sotomo Institute of Zurich which refers to political parties’ ideology
at Swiss Cantonal level use above.
iii) the populist party campaigning for or against the referendum. In relation to the populist party attitude during the
referendum campaign, I decided to use the following scale.
Table B4. Coding scheme fuzzy set POP populist party attitude.
FS score Populist party attitude Condition ID
1 Against the popular vote POP
0.9 Single members in favor of the popular vote POP
0.8 At least a local section in favor POP
0.6 More than 2 local sections in favor POP
0.5 No official position taken —————
0.4 More than 2 local sections against ∼POP
0.2 At least a local section against ∼POP
0.1 Single members against the popular vote ∼POP
0 In favor of the popular vote ∼POP
If the populist party is against the referendum it is given a value of 1, if it is in favor it is given 0. The cut-off point of
maximum ambiguity occurs when there is no position taken towards the referendum or if 50% of the political party is in
favor of the referendum.
4. Popular Initiated Referendums (INI, ∼INI)
The Popular initiated referendum has a clear binary nature and therefore it will have a crisp value of 0 or 1.
Whenever the object is put into popular initiative and opposed by the government the score assigned will be 1 and
whenever it is not a popular initiative, or it is supported by the government the score assigned will be 0.
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Table B5. Coding scheme crisp set INI.
Crisp score Popular vote Government’s official position Condition ID
1 Popular initiative Against popular initiative. INI
0 Facultative referendum, mandatory In favor or against the popular vote. ∼INI
referendum, counterproposal.
0 Popular initiative In favor of popular vote ∼INI
5. Popular Votes with Multiple Issue Calibration (MULT, ∼MULT)
Popular votes withmultiple or single issues have a perfectly binary nature and are based on a perfect symmetrical concept.
Whenever a popular vote is expressed in terms of two or more policies it is member of the set multiple issue and will
receive a score 1. In contrast whenever a popular vote only engulfs a single policy issue it is a member of the set single
issue and will received a score 0.
Table B6. Coding scheme crisp set MULT.
Crisp score Multiple of single issue referendum Condition ID
1 Multiple issues MULT
0 Single issue ∼MULT
6. Political Elite Split/Cohesive Calibration (ELITE, ∼ELITE)
The degree of elite cohesion/division over a popular vote is a fuzzy concept. The degree of elite division refers to an ordinal
scale in which the division is calculated as a percentage of the seats that are opposing or supporting a referendum. In
relation to each cantonal coalition party government, the inter-party division plays an important role in the determina-
tion of elite division. Indeed, the government can have an official position, but one or more political party members of
the government can dissent and campaign against the government’s official position. As a consequence, the government
members could campaign on different fronts and give divergent messages to the electorate.
Table B7 refers to the calibration of elite division in the case the elite support the referendum. The tables also consider
whether the government is formed by a coalition or a single party.
Table B8 refers to the calibration of elite division in case the elite opposes the referendum.
Table B7. Coding scheme fuzzy set ELITE 1.
fs score Elite split: coalition government is partisan of CL extension Condition ID
1 Government parties internally split between right left and center coalition parties ELITE,
0.8 Government internally split with only the right party opposing the government official ELITE,
position
0.6 Government internally split with only the part of the right party opposing the ELITE,
government official position
0.5 No official Government position (No campaign) —————
0.4 Government unified with radical right campaign for the government position AND/OR ∼ELITE
radical right or right parties in the government intra-divided
0.2 Government unified with radical left campaign for the government position AND/OR ∼ELITE
radical left party in the government intra-divided
0 Government cohesive and opposition parties cohesive with the government official position ∼ELITE
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Table B8. Coding scheme fuzzy set ELITE 2.
fs score Elite split: government is against of CL extension Condition ID
1 Government cohesive and opposition parties cohesive with the government official position ELITE,
0.8 Government unified with radical left campaign the government position AND/OR ELITE,
radical left party in the government intra-divided
0.6 Government unified with radical right campaign the government position AND/OR ELITE,
radical right party in the government intra-divided
0.5 No official Government position (No campaign) —————
0.4 Government internally split with only part of the right party opposing the government ∼ELITE
official position
0.2 Government internally split with only the right party opposing the government official ∼ELITE
position
0 Government internally split between right left and center coalition parties ∼ELITE
The two tables calibrate the condition ELITE considering the outcome of CL failure, meaning that a positive value of score
> 0.5 should contribute to the failure of the outcome CL.
The degree of membership will be calculated considering ideological opposition. Indeed, the opposition from the radi-
cal left is less dangerous than opposition from the radical right (Papadopoulos, 1991): although electorallyweak, the radical
right is capable of determining some popular votes in its favor. Moreover, the greater the lack of cohesiveness in the right,
the lower the level of support and the lower the passage rate of the government’s proposals (Kriesi, 2006, p. 606).
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